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Abstract
We present a simple model to illustrate how birthplace diversity may affect team
performance. The model assumes that birthplace diversity increases the stock of
available knowledge due to skill complementarities and decreases efficiency due to
communication barriers. The consequence of these two opposing effects is a hump-
shaped relationship between birthplace diversity and team performance. To verify
this prediction, we exploit self-collected data on the first division of German male
soccer. Our data set covers 7,028 matches and includes information about 3,266
players coming from 98 countries. We propose two different instrumental variable
approaches to identify the effect of birthplace diversity on team performance. Our
findings suggest that an intermediate level of birthplace diversity maximizes team
performance.
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1 Introduction
The increasing importance of team-based production (see Deming, 2017, Jones, 2009,
Wuchty et al., 2007) and the increasing number of multinational working groups (see
Alesina et al., 2016) make the question of how birthplace diversity1 influences team
performance to an issue of high economic relevance. Addressing this open question is
difficult for three reasons. First, birthplace diversity has positive and negative effects:
while complementary skills and experiences improve team performance, communication
barriers reduce working efficiency and thus productivity (Freeman and Huang, 2015).
Second, the data requirements for an empirical study are exceptionally high (Kahane
et al., 2013). Third, various endogeneity problems complicate an identification of the
causal effect.
This paper addresses these three issues and offers new insights into the relationship
between birthplace diversity and team performance. We start with a simple model to
illustrate that birthplace diversity may have a hump-shaped effect on the performance
of a working group. We then present a comprehensive data set including information on
German soccer teams and explain why our data is suited for testing the key predictions
of our model. Finally, we report results from two-stage least squares regressions that
confirm the existence of a hump-shaped relationship between birthplace diversity and
team performance.
In our model, the output of a working group depends on two factors: the available
knowledge and the efficiency with which the members of a team collaborate with each
other. We argue that birthplace diversity influences both of these factors. On the one
hand, individuals born in different countries and educated under different systems have
different ideas and productive skills. The stock of available knowledge thus increases if
the members of a team originate from different countries (Alesina et al., 2016). On the
other hand, when people with different origins collaborate, they often face cultural and
linguistic barriers. Birthplace diversity thus reduces the efficiency of the collaboration
(Lazear, 1999). Our model implies that the consequence of the opposing aspects is a
hump-shaped effect of birthplace diversity on team performance.2
Finding suitable data is a key obstacle when investigating the relationship between
birthplace diversity and team performance. We address this issue with data from the
highest division of male soccer in Germany (Bundesliga). We use soccer data for three
reasons: first, we observe who collaborates with each other; second, we can easily and
precisely measure the performance of a soccer team, and finally, much information on
soccer players is publicly available.
Our data set includes information on 7,028 Bundesliga matches. We know the final
result of each match and have a full list of the fielded players. To create this list, we
1Following Alesina et al. (2016), we define “birthplace diversity” as the probability that two randomly
selected members of a group have different countries of birth.
2It is important to note that the optimal level of birthplace diversity is task-specific. Our model implies
that the optimal level of birthplace diversity decreases if the importance of verbal communication and
personal interaction increases. We show estimation results that are consistent with this prediction.
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digitized match reports published by the German sports magazine Kicker. The total
number of players that were fielded in at least one Bundesliga match is 3,266. For each
player, we identified the country of origin in order to produce team-level measures of
birthplace diversity. We also collected other information, especially two variables that
indicate the quality of the players.
Previous studies using data from sports industry to examine the effect of birthplace
diversity and team performance apply fixed effect models (see Haas and Nu¨esch, 2012,
Kahane et al., 2013). This conventional approach is inappropriate in our case since it
creates estimates that underestimate the true optimal level of birthplace diversity. The
major reason is that birthplace diversity increases during a match if a team performs
badly. We show that team managers replace defensive players with offensive players if
their team is behind (see also Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2014). These substitutions
often have no effect on the final score of a match, but they often increase the birthplace
diversity of the team because the share of foreigners in German clubs is usually larger
among offensive player than among defensive players.
We address endogeneity issues with two instrumental variable approaches. Our first
approach uses starting line-ups that were predicted by the soccer magazine Kicker and
exploits the birthplace diversity in these predicted line-ups as the instrument for the
birthplace diversity of the fielded players. In the second approach, we use unexpected
changes in the birthplace diversity of the starting players to create plausibly exogenous
variation.3 As a robustness check, we only exploit those unexpected changes that are
explainable with injuries.
The results of our instrumental variable regressions suggest that the relationship of
birthplace diversity and team performance is hump-shaped, and thus confirm the key
prediction of our stylized model. The predicted optimal level of birthplace diversity is
around 0.6. Put differently, we observe that team performance is maximized when the
probability that two randomly selected members of a team have different countries of
birth is 60 percent. We also find that a change in birthplace diversity by 10 percentage
points in either direction of the optimal level lowers team performance by 3 percent of
the sample mean.
The literature includes only a few empirical studies that investigate how birthplace
diversity affects team performance.4 None of them tests whether this effect is hump-
shaped.5 Lyons (2017) designs an experiment in which programmers from Bangladesh,
Pakistan, and India are randomly assigned to teams. She observes that multinational
teams are less productive than homogeneous teams. Freeman and Huang (2015) show
3To identify “unexpected changes”, we compare the actual starting line-up with the expected starting
line-up published by Kicker at the day before a match day begins.
4For macroeconomic studies on the relationship between birthplace diversity and economic growth, see
Ager and Brueckner (2013), Alesina et al. (2016), Bove and Elia (2017), Docquier et al. (2018), and
Ottaviano and Peri (2005). For studies on the effect of birthplace diversity on firm performance, see
Parrotta et al. (2014) and Trax et al. (2015). For studies on the effect of ethnic diversity on team
performance, see Hjort (2014) and Marx et al. (2018).
5Ashraf and Galor (2013) find country-level evidence for a hump-shaped relationship between genetic
diversity and economic development.
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that nationally diverse research teams publish more often in high impact journals than
nationally homogeneous research teams. Kahane et al. (2013) use data from the NHL
(National Hockey League) and report that team performance positively correlates with
the share of foreign team members, while birthplace diversity is negatively correlated
with team performance.6
Our paper also relates to the literature that uses data from the professional sports
industry to answer economic questions. Kleven et al. (2013) use information from the
European soccer market to estimate the effect of top tax rates on migration. Parsons
et al. (2011), Price and Wolfers (2010), and Price et al. (2013) investigate same-race
preferences, using sports data from the United States. Arcidiacono et al. (2017), Gould
and Winter (2009), and Guryan et al. (2009) exploit sports data to analyze the role of
peer effects. Krumer and Lechner (2018) and Lichter et al. (2017) use data from the
Bundesliga to examine the role of scheduling in tournaments and to estimate the effects
of air pollution on productivity. Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) and Garicano
et al. (2005) exploit soccer data to study the consequences of social and psychological
pressure.
We proceed as follows. Section 2 presents our model. Section 3 informs about the
Bundesliga and our data. Section 4 describes our identification strategies. Section 5
presents our estimation results. Section 6 concludes.
2 Conceptual framework
In this section, we develop a simple theoretical model that illustrates how birthplace
diversity may affect team performance. This model has two purposes: first, it gives
an intuition about the mechanisms through which birthplace diversity influences team
performance, and second, the key predictions of the model serve as our guide in the
empirical analysis presented in Sections 4 and 5.
We consider a team that consists of n workers originating from m countries. Each
worker i has two traits: an origin-specific trait (qi ∈ [0, 1]) and a personality trait
(pi ∈ [0, 1]) that does not depend on the country of origin. A = {aij}i,j=1,...,n denotes
a similarity matrix in which aij = 1 − |qi − qj | ∈ [0, 1] reflects the extent to which the
origin-specific traits of workers i and j resemble each other. Following Bossert et al.
(2011), we define that the birthplace diversity of the team (δ ∈ [0, 1]) only depends on
the similarity matrix A:
δ = δ
(
A
)
= 0 ⇔ aij = 1 for all i, j = 1, . . . , n (1)
δ = δ
(
A
)
= 1 ⇔ aij = 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , n and i 6= j (2)
6In the management literature, some empirical studies use data from the Bundesliga to investigate the
relationship between birthplace diversity and team performance (see Haas and Nu¨esch (2012), Nu¨esch
(2009) and Brandes et al. (2009)). All of these studies use a fixed effect approach and thus do not take
into account the potential endogeneity of birthplace diversity over the course of a match/season.
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δai,j =
∂ δ
(
A
)
∂ ai,j
< 0 for all i, j = 1, . . . , n with aij ∈ (0, 1). (3)
The performance of teams depends on two factors. The first factor is the available
knowledge:
H = H
(
δ, ρ, ΣQ, ΣP
) ≥ 1 with ΣQ = n∑
i=1
qi and ΣP =
n∑
i=1
pi (4)
where ΣP and ΣQ capture the abilities of the team members and ρ ∈ [0, 1] is the
diversity of the personality traits. We assume that birthplace diversity increases the
available knowledge because workers born in different countries grow up under different
cultural and educational systems and are thus likely to have distinct productive skills
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Alesina et al., 2016, Ashraf and Galor, 2013):7
Hδ =
∂ H
∂ δ
> 0 with lim
δ→0
Hδ = ∞ and lim
δ→1
Hδ = 0 and Hδδ ≤ 0. (5)
The other factor of team performance is the efficiency with which the team members
collaborate with each other:
E = E
(
δ, ρ
) ∈ (0, 1] with E(0, 0) = 1. (6)
The efficiency of the collaboration decreases in birthplace diversity since workers from dif-
ferent countries are likely to face cultural and linguistic barriers (Freeman and Huang,
2015, Lazear, 1999):
Eδ =
∂ E
∂ δ
< 0 with lim
δ→0
Eδ > −∞ and Eδδ ≤ 0. (7)
Assuming a Cobb-Douglas production function, the output of a team is then given
by:
Y = E
(
δ, ρ
)α ·H(δ, ρ, ΣQ, ΣP )1−α with α ∈ (0, 1), (8)
and the first-order condition with respect to δ can be written as:
0 = α · Eδ ·
(
H
(
δ, ρ,ΣQ,ΣP
)
E
(
δ, ρ
) )1−α + (1 − α) · Hδ ·
(
E
(
δ, ρ
)
H
(
δ, ρ,ΣQ,ΣP
))α (9)
From (9), we obtain the following results:
Proposition 1. Conditional on all other determinants of team performance, it holds
that:
(a) Team output Y is a concave function of birthplace diversity δ.
7In line with several related studies, we implicitly assume that different skills complement each other.
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(b) Team output Y is maximized at an intermediate level of birthplace diversity
δ∗ ∈ (0, 1).
(c) The more important efficient collaboration is for team output, the lower is the
optimal level of birthplace diversity:
∂ δ∗
∂ α
< 0 with lim
α→0
δ∗ = 1 and lim
α→1
δ∗ = 0.
3 Data and institutional framework
Finding data that is suited for an examination of the relationship between birthplace
diversity and team performance is difficult because we require: (i) an environment in
which individuals from different countries collaborate with each other, (ii) information
about the composition of working groups, (iii) data on workers’ country of birth, skills
and experiences, and (iv) a measure of the output of the collective effort (Kahane et al.,
2013). This section shows that we meet these requirements when using data from the
Bundesliga.8
3.1 Institutional background
The Bundesliga—the highest division of German male soccer—consists of 18 clubs and
its matches are organized as a double round-robin system. Each club plays 34 matches
per season, 17 of them at home. Bundesliga matches are played in prespecified match
days and usually take place on weekends.9 Seasons are divided into two rounds (August
– December, January – May) and a break of four/five weeks without matches is made
between the first and the second round. In both rounds, a club plays against all other
clubs. If a club has the home field advantage in the first round, the opponent has the
home field advantage in the second round.
A soccer match lasts 90 minutes and consists of two halves. Prior to the match, the
team manager nominates 11 starting players (1 goal keeper, 10 field players) and 7
substitutes. During a match, the team manager can substitute up to 3 players. At the
end of a match, the winner obtains 3 ranking points, while the loser obtains 0. In case
of a draw, both clubs obtain 1 ranking point.10
The starting players and the substitutes are selected out of the squad. The squad
includes all soccer players hired by the club and is compiled by the club managers who
8The literature includes numerous studies that exploit data from sports industry to address economic
questions (for surveys, see Fizel (2017) and Leeds et al. (2018)). In particular, Kahane et al. (2013)
exploit data from the National Hockey League (NHL) to estimate the effect of birthplace diversity on
team performance. We prefer the Bundesliga over the NHL for two main reasons: first, the share and
diversity of foreign players is much greater, and second, the better data availability allows for more
sophisticated identification strategies.
9For organizational reasons, some match days have to take place during midweek days (Tuesday and
Wednesday). For details, see Krumer and Lechner (2018).
10At the end of a season, the total number of ranking points determines the position in the final table.
If two clubs have the same number of points, the difference between the number goals scored and goals
allowed serves as the decision criterion.
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Figure 1 Trends in birthplace diversity — Bundesliga, 1995/96 – 2017/18.
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Notes: The dashed red line illustrates how the share of foreign Bundesliga players developed over
time. All figures are weighted by the number of matches. The bar chart shows how the number of
birth countries changed over time
can change the squad twice a year. The first transfer period is in July and August, the
second is in January. There are no regulations about the size of the squad. A salary
cap does not exist and budgets differ across clubs. The club budget depends on ticket
sales, TV revenues, sponsorship contracts, transfer revenues, and monetary rewards for
participation in European club tournaments.
The rule governing the fielding of foreign players has only changed twice since the
introduction of the Bundesliga in 1963. The initial regulatory scheme lasted until the
middle of the 1995/96 season and allowed the fielding of three foreigners. In December
1995, the European Court of Justice declared the initial form of the three-players rule
illegal on the grounds that it is not compatible with the treaties of the European Union
(Dobson and Goddard, 2011).11 Afterwards, a three-players rule only applied to non-
European players.12 As of the 2004/05 season, also this restriction was abolished.
The dashed line in Figure 1 illustrates how the share of foreign Bundesliga players
changed over time (right scale). In the 1995/96 season, only about one quarter of the
Bundesliga players was not German-born. Caused by the relaxation of the three-players
rule, the share of foreigners began to increase in the 1996/97 season and peaked at 60
percent in the 2002/03 season. Since the 2010/11 season, about half of the Bundesliga
players are German-born.
11This landmark decision is known as Bosman ruling and is named after the Belgian Jean-Marc Bosman
who sued his club, RFC Lie`ge, because of contractual disputes. For details, see Dobson and Goddard
(2011), Kleven et al. (2013), and Simmons (1997).
12This rule had, however, rather little practical relevance since most of the non-Europeans had a dual
citizenship of their country of birth and an European country.
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Figure 1 also includes a bar chart suggesting that the Bundesliga players come from
various countries (left scale). The length of a bar corresponds to the number of birth
countries. Between the 1995/96 season and the 2003/04 season, the number of birth
countries increased from 39 to 61. Since then, the number of birth countries oscillates
between 52 and 64.
3.2 Data
We created a new database including information on all Bundesliga matches from the
1995/96 season up to the 2017/18 season.13 In total, we have information on 7,038
matches and 3,266 soccer players that originate from 98 countries (for a list, see Table
C.1).
For each match, we know the date, the participating clubs, the final result, and the
venue. We also observe the starting line-ups, have precise information on substitutions,
know the ranking position of a club prior to a specific match, identify whether a club
participated in a match of a European club tournament or the national cup in the week
just before or immediately after a Bundesliga match, and know the name of the team
manager in charge. To obtain these information, we use the homepage of the leading
soccer magazine magazine Kicker (www.kicker.de).
In accordance with the related literature, we use two measures of performance. The
first is the number of ranking points that the club obtains at the end of a match. Our
second measure is the difference between goals scored and goals allowed.
We use multiple sources14 to identify the country of birth of all 3, 266 players who
participated in at least one Bundesliga match since July 1995. To measure birthplace
diversity, we calculate Indices of Fractionalization:
BDiv = 1 − 1
n
n∑
i= 1
n∑
j= 1
aij (10)
where n is the number of team members and aij reflects the similarity of the origin-
specific traits of players i and j. Creating (10) requires two steps. In the first step,
we define which players of a club constitute the “team”. Our baseline approach is to
incorporate all players that played for at least 1 minute in a particular match.15 The
second step specifies the similarity matrix A = {aij}i,j=1,...,n. Following Alesina et al.
(2016), we set aij equal to one (zero) if player i and player j have (do not have) the
same country of birth. BDiv thus indicates the probability that two randomly drawn
team members were born in different countries.
13We began the data collection with the 1995/96 season for three reasons: (i) prior to this seasons, it was
prohibited to field more than three foreigners, (ii) as of this season, the winner of a match obtains 3
ranking points, and (iii) data quality.
14Our primary sources of information are the Kicker homepage (www.kicker.de) and the databases
Transfermarkt (www.transfermarkt.com) and World Football (www.worldfootball.net).
15Section 5.3.3 shows that our estimation results remain virtually unchanged when using players that
played for at least 30 minutes.
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For each player, we know the date of birth, the date at which he was hired, and the
number of matches that he has played prior to a particular Bundesliga match in (i) the
Bundesliga, (ii) the highest soccer divisions in France, England, Italy, and Spain, (iii)
an European club tournament, and (iv) European and world championships.16 These
information come from the online databases Transfermarkt (www.transfermarkt.com)
and World Football (www.worldfootball.net). Furthermore, our dataset includes two
expert-based measures of players’ quality. The first is the market value as reported by
Transfermarkt. Our second measure of quality comes from the video game series FIFA
which is released annually by the video game company Electronic Arts. In this popular
video game, each player has a playing strength ranging from 0 to 100. We use a PHP
script to download these ratings from the FIFA online database (www.fifaindex.com).
Our two measures of players’ quality have the shortcoming that they are only available
for the 13 latest seasons (2005/06 – 2017/18).
4 Empirical framework
4.1 Fixed effect model
The key predictions of the model presented in Section 2 suggest that the relationship
between birthplace diversity and team performance can be well described with the
model:
Yi = β1 · BDivi + β2 · BDiv2i + γ ·Xi + εi (11)
where i is the team, BDiv the level of birthplace diversity, and Y the measure of
performance. X includes other factors of team performance and ε denotes the error
term. The optimal level of birthplace diversity is then:
BDiv∗ = − β1
2 · β2 with β1 ∈ [0, −2 · β2] and β2 < 0. (12)
Estimating the parameters β1 and β2 is challenging for several reasons. A major
difficulty is to specify the vector X such that the point estimates of β1 and β2 do not
suffer from an omitted-variable bias. Our baseline analysis addresses this issue in the
following way. First, we use a rich set of fixed effects to capture all factors that are
specific to a club in a round of a particular season if a particular team manager is in
charge. These factors include: the abilities of the manager and his staff members, the
composition of the squad, the budget and prestige of a club, the quality of the training
center and youth section, and the fan base. Furthermore, we add variables to X that
reflect the experience and the skill level of the team members. We also control for the
home field advantage and take the opponent into account.
Our basic regression model is:
16We choose the leagues of France, England, Italy, and Spain since the level of play in these league is
similar to the level of play in Germany.
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Yisrmd = β1 · BDivisrmd + β2 · BDiv2isrmd + γ ·Xisrmd + ξisrm + θd + εisrmd (13)
where i is the club, s the season, m the manager, and d the match day. r ∈ {1, 2}
indicates whether a match belongs to the first/second round of a season. X includes
several team, manager, and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2). ξ is a
club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effect and θ a match day fixed effect.17
The estimates of β1, β2, and BDiv
∗ that we obtain when estimating (13) might be
biased for three reasons. First, the fixed effects and control variables do not suffice to
capture all confounding factors. Second, the measure of birthplace diversity may suffer
from measurement error and thus creates an attenuation bias. Third, reverse causality
may exist because the composition of a team changes over time and these changes may
depend on the performance of a team.18
4.2 Two-stage least squares model
We believe that reverse causality is the most serious endogeneity problem19 and that
it causes a downward bias in the estimates of the optimal level of birthplace diversity
(BDiv∗). The reason is that a team manager replaces defensive players with offensive
players during a match when his team is behind (Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2014).
These performance-related substitutions often do not have an effect on the result of a
match, but often increase birthplace diversity since German soccer clubs usually hire
much more foreign offensive players than foreign defensive players (for a more detailed
description, see Appendix A).
4.2.1 Diversity in the starting line-up predicted by Kicker
We allay endogeneity concerns with two instrumental variables approaches. The first
approach exploits information from the prestigious soccer magazine Kicker. For each
Bundesliga match, Kicker publishes an expected starting line-up at the day before the
first match of a match day begins. We digitized all 7,956 expected starting line-ups
published between July 2005 and June 201820 and identified the country of birth of all
listed players. We use these information to estimate the first-stage equations:
17For example, in the second round of the 2008/09 season, Ju¨rgen Klinsmann was the responsible team
manager of Bayern Munich in the first twelve matches, while Jupp Heynckes was the team manager in
charge in the last five matches. The fixed effect ξ controls for the mean performance within each of
these periods and absorbs all club-, manager-, round-, and season-specific factors that do not change
over the course of each of these periods.
18For a detailed discussion of why and how the composition of a working group changes over time, see
Arrow et al. (2000).
19The large number of fixed effects and the rich set of control variables, which especially includes two
measure of quality, make us confident that “omitted factors” are much less likely to be a source of
significant bias than “reverse causality”. The fixed effect and instrumental variable estimates that we
report in Section 5 are consistent with this presumption.
20We cannot expand the sample because of limited data availability and low data quality.
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Figure 2 Accuracy of the predicted starting line-up.
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Notes: The left graph shows how likely it is that a player who is part of the starting line-up predicted
by Kicker also belongs to actual starting line-up. The right graph shows how likely it is that there are
no (one, two, or more than two) discrepancies between the starting line-up predicted by Kicker and
the actual starting line-up.
BDivisrmd = ρ1 ·Kisrmd + ρ2 ·K2isrmd + α ·Xisrmd + ξisrm + θd + ηisrmd (14)
BDiv2isrmd = δ1 ·Kisrmd + δ2 ·K2isrmd + λ ·Xisrmd + ξisrm + θd + µisrmd (15)
where K is the birthplace diversity in the starting line-up predicted by Kicker.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the actual starting line-ups and the starting
line-ups predicted by Kicker. The left graph shows that 87 percent of the start players
belong to the expected starting line-up. This overlap is reassuring because it suggests
strong first-stage relationships. A concern might be that Kicker correctly predicts the
actual starting line-up in most of the cases and makes serious mistakes in a few very
specific cases. The right graph of Figure 2 addresses this issue. We show that Kicker
correctly predicts the full starting line-up in only 23 percent of the cases and that the
number of incorrect predictions per starting line-up is usually small.
4.2.2 Unexpected changes in birthplace diversity
Our second approach uses changes in birthplace diversity that result from unexpected
changes in the starting line-ups. To produce our instrumental variable, we proceed in
three steps. First, we distinguish between three groups of players (for an example, see
Figure B.1). The first groups includes all players that belong to the starting line-up
predicted by Kicker and are no start players (A). The second group includes all start
players that are not part of the expected starting line-up (B). The last group includes
all remaining start players (C).
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In the second step, we calculate the average dissimilarity between the players in C
and A (B):
∆(A, C) = 1|A| ·
1
|C| ·
∑
j ∈A
∑
k∈C
(1 − ajk) (16)
∆(B, C) = 1|B| ·
1
|C| ·
∑
j ∈B
∑
k∈C
(1 − ajk) (17)
where a ∈ [0, 1] is the similarity of the origin-specific characteristics of player j and
player k. In the last step, we define the instrumental variable (Z) as the difference of
∆(B, C) and ∆(A, C):
Z = ∆(B, C) − ∆(A, C). (18)
The variable Z is different from zero only if we observe an unexpected change in the
starting line-up and if the players in A and B were not born in the same countries.
Z is positive when the dissimilarity between the players that unexpectedly belonged to
the starting line-up and the other start players (∆(B, C)) is larger than the dissimilarity
between the players that unexpectedly dropped out from the starting line-up and the
players that belonged to both the actual and the expected starting line-up (∆(A, C)).
Since we assume a hump-shaped relationship between birthplace diversity and team
performance, we need to instrument both the measure of birthplace diversity and its
squared term. Following Ashraf and Galor (2013), we use a three-stage procedure to
address this issue.21 In the first step, we perform a zero-stage regression in which the
measure of birthplace diversity is regressed on the instrumental variable (Z) and the
controls of the second-stage equation:
BDivisrmd = φ · Zisrmd + pi ·Xisrmd + ξisrm + θd + νisrmd.22 (19)
We then exploit the point estimates that we obtain when estimating (19) to calculate
predicted values of birthplace diversity (B̂Div). Finally, we use these predicted values
and their squared terms as instruments. Taken together, we estimate the first-stage
equations:23
BDivisrmd = ρ1 · B̂Divisrmd + ρ2 · B̂Div
2
isrmd + α ·Xisrmd + ξisrm + θd + ηisrmd (20)
21For details about the econometric foundation of the procedure used by Ashraf and Galor (2013), see
Angrist and Pischke (2009) and Wooldridge (2010). We require the zero-stage regression since Z2 and
BDiv2 are only weakly correlated. The reason for this weak correlation is twofold: first, Z ∈ [−1, 1]
and BDiv ∈ [0, 1] have different domains, and second, squaring is a non-monotonic transformation
when the domain is [−1, 1] , while it is a monotonic transformation when the domain is [0, 1].
22Figure B.3 shows the unconditional relationship of the birthplace diversity of a team (BDiv) and the
instrumental variable Z. We observe a positive correlation between Z and BDiv. The correlation is
0.107 and statistically significant at the 1 percent level. This result is encouraging since it suggests a
sound zero-stage relationship.
23It is irrelevant for the second-stage estimates of β1, β2, and BDiv
∗ whether we use the variable Z
or the predicted value B̂Div in the first-stage equations. Using B̂Div eases the interpretation of the
reduced-form estimates.
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BDiv2isrmd = δ1 · B̂Divisrmd + δ2 · B̂Div
2
isrmd + λ ·Xisrmd + ξisrm + θd + µisrmd. (21)
5 Results
5.1 Fixed effect estimates
In Table 1, we report our fixed effect estimates on the relationship between birthplace
diversity and team performance. We exploit two different samples and two alternative
measures of team performance. Columns 1 and 2 present results from estimating (13)
when using the difference between goals scored and goals allowed as measure of team
performance. In Columns 3 and 4, we measure team performance with the number of
ranking points that the club obtains at the match. Columns 1 and 3 exploit the full
sample which includes 7,038 Bundesliga matches. The reduced sample which is used in
Columns 2 and 4 comprises 3,978 Bundesliga matches. The advantage of the reduced
sample is that we can add the market value and the FIFA score to the list of control
variable and thus control more efficiently for the quality of a team. We use standard
errors robust against heteroscedasticity and clustered at the club-by-season-by-round-by-
manager level.
The conventional method to test for the presence of a hump-shaped relationship is
checking whether the estimate of the quadratic term of the variable of interest (βˆ2) is
negative and statistically significant at conventional levels. Lind and Mehlum (2010)
argue that this common procedure is misleading if the optimal point is not within the
lower and upper bound of the data range. Put differently, the point estimates of β2
indicate whether the relationship between birthplace diversity and team performance is
concave (Proposition 1a), but they do not show whether the optimal level of birthplace
diversity is between 0 and 1 (Proposition 1b). Lind and Mehlum (2010) also develop a
statistical test that addresses this problem. We apply this test and thus structure our
regression tables in the following way. The upper part of the table shows the results of
the Lind-Mehlum-Test, consisting of the estimated optimal level of birthplace diversity
(BDiv∗) and a p-value that reveals the presence of a hump-shaped relationship within
the data range. The lower part of the table presents the regression coefficients of the
parameters β1 and β2 and their p-values.
Our fixed effect estimates provide only little evidence for a hump-shaped relationship
between birthplace diversity and team performance. The regression coefficients of the
parameter β2 have the correct sign, but are not statistically significant at conventional
levels in three out of four cases. The results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test suggest that the
optimal level of birthplace diversity (BDiv∗) is not statistically different from zero and
point to a negative rather than a hump-shaped effect of birthplace diversity on team
performance.24
24Consistent with the results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, we observe negative and statistically significant
estimates of the parameter β1 when excluding the squared term of the measure of birthplace diversity
(BDiv2) from the regression model (see Table C.3). This result fits together with other studies using
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Table 1 Birthplace diversity and team performance: fixed effect estimates.
Goal Difference Points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.148 0.138 0.234 0.273
(0.387) (0.430) (0.224) (0.246)
Regression coefficients
Diversity team (β1) 0.310 0.259 0.552 0.738
(0.774) (0.861) (0.449) (0.492)
Diversity team squared (β2) -1.050 -0.938 -1.182** -1.351
(0.233) (0.427) (0.049) (0.114)
Observations 14,076 7,956 14,076 7,956
Seasons 23 13 23 13
Quality controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports results from fixed effect regressions. The upper part of the table shows the results of the
Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager, and opponent
characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We cluster standard
errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
5.2 Instrumental variable estimates
We argue that the fixed effect estimates presented in Table 1 underestimate the true
optimal level of birthplace diversity because of reverse causality. Reverse causality is
a problem because the substitutions that the team managers make during a match are
endogenous to the performance of their team. Team managers increase the number of
offensive players and decrease the number of defensive players if their team performs
badly (Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2014). These changes often do not influence the
outcome of a match, but they often increase birthplace diversity because the share of
German offensive players is usually smaller than the share of German defensive players
(for details, see Appendix A).
5.2.1 Diversity in expected starting line-up
We address endogeneity issues with two instrumental variable approaches. In our first
approach, we exploit the starting line-ups predicted by the sports magazine Kicker and
use the birthplace diversity in an expected starting line-up as the instrument for the
birthplace diversity of the fielded players. Since Kicker publishes its expected starting
line-up at least one day before a match begins, our approach allays any concern about
reverse causality.
Columns 1 and 2 of Table 2 show the reduced-form estimates for our two measures
of team performance. We have to restrict our analysis to the reduced sample because of
limited data availability. The regression coefficients suggest a hump-shaped relationship
fixed effects models and data from sports industry to examine the effect of birthplace diversity on team
performance (Haas and Nu¨esch, 2012, Kahane et al., 2013, Maderer et al., 2014). We believe that the
estimates reported in Table C.3 are biased due to reverse causality (for details, see Appendix A).
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Table 2 Birthplace diversity and team performance: 2SLS estimates (expected starting line-up).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.588* 0.563* 0.609* 0.582*
(0.067) (0.058) (0.072) (0.062)
Regression coefficients
Diversity Kicker 1.793 1.27
(0.102) (0.117)
Diversity Kicker squared -1.524* -1.128*
(0.091) (0.094)
Diversity team (β1) 5.339 3.795
(0.103) (0.123)
Diversity squared team (β2) -4.386* -3.261*
(0.093) (0.100)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 125.52 125.52
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 287.19 287.19
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. The
first-stage estimates are reported in Table C.4. We present the first-stage diagnostics proposed by Sanderson and
Windmeijer (2016) and Stock and Wright (2000) in the bottom part of the table. Non of these tests indicate a weak
instrument problem. We cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
between the birthplace diversity in the expected starting line-up and the performance of
the fielded players. The results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test confirm this finding.
Columns 3 and 4 of Table 2 present the second-stage estimates. Consistent with the
predictions of our stylized model (see Section 2), we find that an intermediate level of
birthplace diversity maximizes the performance of a team. Our estimates also suggest
that changing the birthplace diversity by 10 percentage points in either direction at the
predicted optimal level (≈ 0.6) decreases the goal difference by 0.044, which is 3.149
percent of the sample mean.25 Projected to the season as a whole, this amounts to a
decrease in the goal difference by more than one goal.
5.2.2 Unexpected changes in diversity
Table 3 shows the results of our second instrumental variable approach. This approach
exploits unexpected changes in the birthplace diversity of the start players to create a
predicted value of the birthplace diversity of the fielded players and uses this predicted
value (and its squared term) as an instrument for the actual birthplace diversity of the
fielded players (for details, see Section 4.2.2).
25A change of 10 percentage points in birthplace diversity means that the probability that two randomly
chosen team members have the same country of birth increases/decreases by 10 percentage points.
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Table 3 Birthplace diversity and team performance: 2SLS estimates (unexpected changes).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.721* 0.573 0.605** 0.586*
(0.050) (0.173) (0.022) (0.073)
Regression coefficients
B̂Div 6.367** 2.375
(0.045) (0.267)
B̂Div
2
-4.414** -2.073
(0.024) (0.126)
Diversity team (β1) 42.230** 19.154
(0.044) (0.147)
Diversity squared team (β2) -34.883** -16.33
(0.042) (0.134)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 13.41 13.41
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 14.02 14.02
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.002
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. The
first-stage estimates are reported in Table C.5. We present the first-stage diagnostics proposed by Sanderson and
Windmeijer (2016) and Stock and Wright (2000) in the bottom part of the table. Non of these tests indicate a weak
instrument problem. We cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values
in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
The structure of Table 3 is the same as the structure of Table 2. Columns 1 and
2 present the reduced-form estimates, while Columns 3 and 4 report the second-stage
estimates. All estimates are based on the reduced sample and we use two measures of
team performance.
Table 3 shows that the reduced-form estimates vary slightly depending on how we
measure performance. When using the goal difference (Column 1), we observe that the
estimates have the expected sign and are statistically significant at conventional levels.
The reduced-form estimates keep their signs if we apply the number of ranking points.
However, their levels of statistical significance slightly decrease (Column 2). We think
that these differences are plausible.26
The results of the second-stage regressions are consistent with the key predictions of
our stylized model. The Lind-Mehlum-Tests confirm the existence of a hump-shaped
relationship between birthplace diversity and team performance. Reassuringly, we find
that the predicted optimal level of birthplace diversity closely resembles the predicted
optimum reported in Table 2. The regression coefficients of β1 and β2 are statistically
26The number of ranking points often does not indicate performance differences even if they exist. For
example, if a team loses a match zero to one, it receives the same number of ranking points as it would
obtains if it loses zero to five. Due to this low distinctiveness, we argue that the number of ranking
points is a less precise measure of team performance than the goal difference.
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significant at the five percent levels when we measure team performance with the goal
difference (Column 3). The p-values are slightly above ten percent when we use the
number of ranking points (Column 4). The point estimates suggest that a change in
birthplace diversity by 10 percentage points in either direction at the predicted optimal
level decreases the difference between goals s cored and goals allowed by 0.035.
5.3 Discussion
In Section 5.2, we report results from two-stage least squares regressions suggesting a
hump-shaped relationship of birthplace diversity and team performance. This section
presents a battery of robustness checks and investigates whether the optimal level of
birthplace diversity varies depending on the importance of communication.
5.3.1 Injuries as source of variation
A concern may be that the discrepancies between the actual starting line-ups and the
starting line-ups predicted by Kicker do not occur randomly. The estimates shown in
Tables 2 and 3 are biased if the causes of the discrepancies are not captured by our
control variables. We think that this is unlikely because of the comprehensive list of
controls (see Table C.2) and the great number of fixed effects.
To strengthen the credibility of our results, we perform a robustness check that only
exploits those discrepancies between the actual and the expected starting line-ups that
are explainable with short-term injuries. We argue that the short-term injuries occur
coincidentally and can thus be used to create plausibly exogenous variation in teams’
composition.
We define that an injury serves as an explanation for a discrepancy in either of the
following cases: (i) Kicker predicted that a player would be a starting player, but this
player did not play since he was injured or did not completely recover from an injury.
(ii) Kicker predicted that a player could not play because of an injury, but he was fit
enough for attending the match. To identify the incorrect predictions that are caused
by an injury, we analyzed articles and match reports published by Kicker and exploited
the online database Transfermarkt. In total, injuries explain 30 percent of the incorrect
predictions.
To exploit injuries to create exogenous variation in birthplace diversity, we slightly
adjust the three-step procedure described in Section 4.2.2. The major change concerns
the first step which classifies players into different groups. The first group (A˜) now
includes players that belonged to the starting line-up predicted by Kicker, but did not
attend to the match because of an injury. The second group (B˜) includes start players
that were not part of the expected starting line-up and replaced an injured player. The
third group (C˜) includes all other starting players (for an example, see Figure B.2).
The other steps of the procedure are the same as above. We calculate the average
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dissimilarity between the players in C˜ and A˜ (B˜):
∆(A˜, C˜) = 1|A˜| ·
1
|C˜| ·
∑
j ∈ A˜
∑
k∈ C˜
(1 − ajk) (22)
∆(B˜, C˜) = 1|B˜| ·
1
|C˜| ·
∑
j ∈ B˜
∑
k∈ C˜
(1 − ajk). (23)
and define the variable Z˜ as the difference between ∆(B˜, C˜) and ∆(A˜, C˜):
Z˜ = ∆(B˜, C˜) − ∆(A˜, C˜).27 (24)
We then run the zero-stage regression and use the estimated regression coefficients to
compute predicted values of birthplace diversity (B˜Div), which serve—along with their
squared terms—as the instrumental variables (for details, see Section 4.2.2).
Table C.6 illustrates that the signs of the regression coefficients of β1 and β2 are
consistent with the predictions of our stylized model when using injuries as source of
exogenous variation. We find that the estimates are statistically significant at the 10
percent level when we use the goal difference to as measure of team performance. The
Lind-Mehlum-Test suggests that the optimal level of birthplace diversity is about 0.63,
which is remarkably close to the figures reported in Tables 2 and 3. The predicted
optimal level is 0.61 when we measure team performance with the number of ranking
points. However, the estimate is not statistically significant at a standard level in this
case (p-value: 0.264).
5.3.2 Alternative measures of birthplace diversity
The main challenge when computing an index of birthplace diversity is to specify the
similarity matrix A = {aij}i,j=1,...,n. Following Alesina et al. (2016), we use a binary
similarity matrix: aij is equal to 1 if player i and player j were born in the same
country, and is equal to 0 if these players come from different countries. To examine
whether our main findings on the relationship between birthplace diversity and team
performance change if we use a more distinctive similarity matrix, we exploit data on
linguistic distance from Spolaore and Wacziarg (2016). Tables C.8 and C.9 indicate
that our results are robust to this change in the similarity matrix.
5.3.3 Alternative definition of team
In our main analyses, a “team” includes all players that participated in a match for at
least 1 minute. This approach may be criticized since it is debatable whether a player
that is fielded for only a few minutes actually affects the performance of a team. As
a robustness check, we thus count only those players as team members that played for
27Figure B.4 illustrates the unconditional relationship between the instrumental variable (Z˜) and the
birthplace diversity of the team (BDiv). The correlation of Z˜ and BDiv is 0.088 and statistically
significant at the 1 percent level.
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at least 30 minutes. Tables C.10 and C.11 illustrate that our results remain almost
unchanged when using this alternative definition of “team”.
5.3.4 Performance trends
The literature on sport science suggests that self-confidence is an important factor of
success (Fletcher and Sarkar, 2012, Hays et al., 2009, Woodman and Hardy, 2003). In
soccer, a major determinant of self-confidence is the performance in previous matches.
Since our basic regression model does not control for past performance and unexpected
changes in the starting line-ups might be correlated with past performance, our 2SLS
estimates may be biased because of a violation of the exclusion restriction. To alleviate
this concern, we add the first two lags of the dependent variable to the list of controls.
Tables C.12 and C.13 suggest that this model extension does not lead to significant
changes in our estimation results.
5.3.5 Migration
Anther concern may be that the country of birth differs from the country in which a
player grew up. The 2SLS estimates shown in Tables 2 and 3 would be biased if such
discrepancies produce a non-classical measurement error in the measure of birthplace
diversity. To alleviate this concern, we identified for each player the country where he
lived during his youth. The web database Transfermarkt served as our main source of
information and we found that this country differs from the country of birth for 6.5
percent of the players. Tables C.14 and C.15 show that our 2SLS estimates do not
significantly change when we exploit the countries where the players lived during their
youth to measure birthplace diversity.
5.3.6 Alternative procedure for measuring unexpected changes
In our basic approach, we distinguish between three groups of players and use a three-
stage procedure to create an instrumental variable (Z) that reflects unexpected changes
in birthplace diversity (see Section 4.2.2). An alternative approach is to calculate the
difference of the birthplace diversity in the actual starting line-up and the birthplace
diversity in the starting line-up predicted by Kicker. Table C.16 presents estimation
results suggesting that we obtain similar estimates for the optimal level of birthplace
diversity when applying the alternative procedure for measuring unexpected changes in
birthplace diversity. We prefer our basic approach for two reasons: first, the first-stage
F-statistics are slightly higher, and second, it is easier to restrict the analysis to those
unexpected changes that are caused by injuries.
5.3.7 Linear model
The related literature includes some studies that use data from the professional sports
industry and fixed effect models to examine the effect of birthplace diversity on team
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performance. Most of these studies find that the negative effects of birthplace diversity
outweigh the positive effects (see Haas and Nu¨esch, 2012, Kahane et al., 2013, Maderer
et al., 2014). Table C.3 shows that our fixed effect results point in the same direction
if we exclude the squared term of birthplace diversity from the regression model. Our
instrumental variable estimates, however, do not suggest a linear relationship between
birthplace diversity and team performance (see Tables C.17 and C.18).
5.3.8 Piecewise regression approach
The estimates reported in Table 2 and 3 suggest that the optimal level of birthplace
diversity (BDiv∗) is around 0.6. This implies that an increase in birthplace diversity
(BDiv) improves (reduces) team performance if BDiv is smaller (larger) than BDiv∗.
Put differently, if we estimate a linear regression model and restrict the sample to the
observations with BDiv < BDiv∗ (BDiv > BDiv∗), we should find that birthplace
diversity positively (negatively) affects team performance. Columns 1 and 2 of Table
C.19 illustrates that this is indeed the case, if the birthplace diversity in the starting
line-up predicted by Kicker serves as the instrumental variable.
Combining the piecewise regression approach with our second instrumental variable
approach is slightly more difficult because it exploits changes in birthplace diversity to
create plausibly exogenous variation. Assume that the actual birthplace diversity of a
team exceeds the optimal level (BDiv > BDiv∗) and that an unexpected change in
birthplace diversity occurs (Z 6= 0). If this change is positive (negative), birthplace
diversity moves away from (towards) the optimal level. We therefore expect a negative
(positive) estimate when estimating the linear model and restricting the sample to the
observations with Z larger (smaller) than 0. Columns 3 and 4 of Table C.19 confirm
this expectation.28
5.3.9 Heterogeneity in the optimal level of birthplace diversity
The key prediction of the model developed in Section 2 is that an intermediate level
of birthplace diversity maximizes the performance of a working group. The results of
our empirical analyses confirm this prediction. Our simple model also predicts that the
optimal level of birthplace diversity varies depending on how important it is that team
members effectively communicate with each other (see Proposition 1c). In this section,
we examine the accuracy of this prediction.
The performance of a soccer team has two key components: scoring goals (offensive
performance) and preventing goals (defensive performance). Because communication is
less important in the offense than in the defense, we expect that the optimal level of
birthplace diversity is lower for defensive performance than for offensive performance.
The estimation results reported in Table C.20 are consistent with our expectations. In
Column 1, we examine the effect of birthplace diversity and offensive performance. We
28We cannot conduct this robustness check for the case BDiv < BDiv∗ because the sample size is too
small.
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assume that midfielders and forwards are responsible for the offense and thus use the
birthplace diversity of these players as explanatory variable. The birthplace diversity of
the midfielders and forwards in the starting line-up predicted by Kicker serves as our
instrumental variable.29 Our regression coefficients suggests that the optimal level of
birthplace diversity for offensive performance is around 0.65. Column 2 indicates that
the optimal level of birthplace diversity for defensive performance is considerably lower
(0.5). In this case, the explanatory variable is the birthplace diversity of the defenders
and midfielders.
6 Conclusion
Since multinational working groups have become more prevalent in almost all advanced
economies, understanding how birthplace diversity affects the performance of a team is
highly important. This paper presents a simple model to illustrate that this effect is
hump-shaped if collaboration requires verbal communication and if team members born
in different countries have complementary abilities. To examine the accuracy of this
prediction, we exploit self-collected data from the Bundesliga, the highest division of
German male soccer. Our data covers 23 seasons and includes detailed information on
3,266 players coming from 98 countries. We illustrate that the fixed effect estimator
underestimates the true optimal level of birthplace diversity, especially due to reverse
causality, and address endogeneity problems with two instrumental variable approaches.
The first approach exploits the birthplace diversity in a predicted line-up to produce
plausibly exogenous variation in the birthplace diversity of the fielded players, whereas
the second approach uses unexpected last-minute changes in the birthplace diversity of
the starting players as source of exogenous variation. The results of our instrumental
variable regressions imply that the effect of birthplace diversity on team performance is
hump-shaped. The predicted optimal level of birthplace diversity is 0.6.
Our study is the first to identify a causal non-linear relationship between birthplace
diversity and team performance. We thus provide clear evidence for the existence of
a trade-off between the beneficial and the adverse effects of diversity on productivity
(Alesina and La Ferrara, 2005, Lazear, 1999): while homogeneous teams do not have
sufficient diversity in perspectives and skills, highly heterogeneous work groups cannot
effectively communicate and therefore suffer from coordination problems.
A concern may be that professional soccer is a rather special industry and that the
external validity of our results is thus low. We argue that this is not the case since
effective interaction and diversity in skills are both factors for success in various fields.
Examples include: research and development, arts and music, consultancy, marketing,
and other creative professions. However, our model suggests that the optimal level of
birthplace diversity is likely to differ between and within these working fields. We also
29We cannot use our second instrumental variable approach since the first-stage diagnostics indicate a
weak instrument problem.
20
provide empirical evidence confirming that the optimal level of birthplace diversity is
task-specific.30
Finding the optimal levels of birthplace diversity in other working fields should be a
key objective of future research. Another pending issue is whether the optimal level of
birthplace diversity varies depending on other characteristics of the team, such as age,
tenure, or quality. Finally, there still exists a lack of causal evidence on the channels
through which birthplace diversity affects team performance.
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A Additional information on the fixed effect model
Although our basic regression model (see (13)) includes a rich set of fixed effects and
various control variables, we argue that this model is unsuited for an analysis of the
relationship between birthplace diversity and team performance. We are convinced that
the fixed effect estimator underestimate the optimal level of birthplace diversity due to
reverse causality. This section presents results that substantiate our claim.
Our analysis consists of three parts. The first part shows how team managers react
during a match if the performance of their team is low. To address this question, we
divide each match into eighteen non-overlapping five-minute periods and estimate the
regression model:
Oeisrmdp = α ·Obisrmdp + β · Bbisrmdp + γ ·Xbisrmdp + ξisrmd + θp + εisrmdp (A1)
where i is a club, s a season, m a manager, d a match day, r a round, and p a
five-minute period. Ob/Oe is the number of fielded offensive players (forwards) at the
beginning/end of a period. B is a dummy variable that is equal to 1 if the team is
behind at the beginning of the period p. The vector X includes team and opponent
controls. ξ is the team-by-match fixed effect, θ the period fixed effect, and ε an error
term.
Table C.21 presents results from estimating (A1). Column 1 uses the full sample.
Column 2 exploits the reduced sample and controls for the quality of fielded players.
Consistent with the findings of Garicano and Palacios-Huerta (2014), we observe that
team managers increase the number of fielded forwards if their team is behind.
The second part of our analysis studies whether birthplace diversity varies with the
score of a match. We address this issue with the regression model:
Deisrmdp = α ·Dbisrmdp + β · Bbisrmdp + γ ·Xbisrmdp + ξisrmd + θp + εisrmdp (A2)
where Db/De is the level of birthplace diversity at the beginning/end of a five-minute
period. The other components of (A2) have the same meaning as in (A1).
Table C.22 reports results from estimating (A2). We find that birthplace diversity
increases during a match if a team is behind regardless of whether we exploit the full
sample (see Column 1) or the reduced sample (see Column 2).
The last part of our analysis provides an explanation for why low team performance
causes an increase in birthplace diversity. There are two reasons: first, team managers
dislike losses and thus replace defensive players with offensive players if their team is
behind (see Table C.21), and second, the share of foreigners in German soccer clubs is
much larger among offensive players than among defensive players. Put differently, we
argue that the increase in the number of forwards is the channel through which team
A1
performance affects birthplace diversity.31 The estimation results shown in Table C.23
support this argument. We find that the estimate of the effect of team performance on
birthplace diversity becomes statistically insignificant when we extent regression model
(A2) by the number of fielded offensive players at the end of a five-minute period.
B Additional figures
Figure B.1 Classification of players: Baseline approach (example)
Predicted Line-up Starting Line-up
Ulreich
Kimmich Su¨le Hummels Alaba
Martinez Thiago James
Mu¨ller Lewandowski Ribery
Ulreich
Kimmich Su¨le Hummels Rafinha
Tolisso Thiago James
Mu¨ller Lewandowski Ribery
Notes: The left panel shows the expected starting line-up of Bayern Mu¨nchen for the match on Saturday, 12th May
2018. Kicker published this line-up on Friday, 11th May 2018. The right panel shows the actual starting line-up. We
use blue characters to indicate players (Alaba, Martinez) that belong to group A, red characters to indicate players
(Rafinha, Tolisso) that belong to group B, and black characters to indicate players that belong to group C.
Figure B.2 Classification of players; Alternative approach (example)
Predicted Line-up Starting Line-up
Ulreich
Kimmich Su¨le Hummels Alaba
Martinez Thiago James
Mu¨ller Lewandowski Ribery
Ulreich
Kimmich Su¨le Hummels Rafinha
Tolisso Thiago James
Mu¨ller Lewandowski Ribery
Notes: The left panel shows the expected starting line-up of Bayern Mu¨nchen for the match on Saturday, 12th May
2018. Kicker published this line-up on Friday, 11th May 2018. The right panel shows the actual starting line-up. We
use blue characters to indicate players (Alaba) that belong to group A˜, red characters to indicate players (Rafinha)
that belong to group B˜, and black characters to indicate players that belong to group C˜. Players (Martinez) colored
in violet belong to neither of the three groups. David Alaba belongs to group A˜ because he unexpectedly missed the
match because of back problems.
31Our data suggests that the share of foreign defenders and foreign midfielders is around 45 percent,
whereas the share of foreign forwards is around 65 percent.
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Figure B.3 Unconditional zero-stage relationship (all unexpected changes).
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Notes: The figure depicts the positive correlation between the birthplace diversity of a team
(BDiv) and our instrumental variable Z as defined in (18). The correlation coefficient is 0.107
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Figure B.4 Unconditional zero-stage relationship (only unexpected changes caused by injuries).
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Notes: The figure depicts the positive correlation between the birthplace diversity of a team
(BDiv) and our instrumental variable Z˜ as defined in (24). The correlation coefficient is 0.088
and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
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C Additional tables
Table C.1 List of countries.
Country Country Country
Albania (13) Gambia (3) Norway (36)
Algeria (1) Georgia (9) Paraguay (5)
Argentina (36) Germany (1534) Peru (6)
Armenia (1) Ghana (26) Poland (89)
Australia (16) Greece (19) Portugal (16)
Austria (71) Guinea (3) Romania (28)
Azerbaijan (1) Guinea-Bissau (2) Russia (16)
Belarus (3) Hungary (27) Senegal (11)
Belgium (38) Iceland (6) Serbia (47)
Benin (2) Iran (10) Sierra Leone (3)
Bolivia (1) Israel (5) Slovakia (23)
Bosnia and Herzegovina (35) Italy (13) Slovenia (14)
Brazil (141) Ivory Coast (12) South Africa (11)
Bulgaria (24) Jamaica (2) Spain (38)
Burkina Faso (3) Japan (28) Suriname (4)
Cameroon (25) Kazakhstan (5) Sweden (39)
Canada (9) Korea (11) Switzerland (79)
Cape Verde (1) Kosovo (17) Syria (1)
Chile (8) Latvia (2) Tajikistan (3)
China (3) Lebanon (2) Togo (4)
Colombia (8) Liechtenstein (1) Trinidad and Tobago (1)
Congo Demo. Rep. (12) Lithuania (1) Tunisia (10)
Cong Rep. (4) Luxembourg (2) Turkey (17)
Costa Rica (1) Macedonia (16) Ukraine (20)
Croatia (71) Mali (2) United Kingdom (15)
Cyprus (1) Malta (1) United States (32)
Czech Republic (70) Mexico (8) Uruguay (7)
Denmark (75) Moldova (2) Venezuela (5)
Ecuador (3) Montenegro (9) Zambia (3)
Egypt (7) Morocco (8) Zimbabwe (1)
Equatorial Guinea (3) Mozambique (1)
Estonia (1) Namibia (2)
Finland (12) Netherlands (72)
France (92) Nigeria (26)
Notes: This table lists the countries from which the players in our sample originate. In parenthesis, we report the
number of players born in a particular country.
A4
Table C.2 List of control variables (X).
Variable Description
Home Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a team had the home
field advantage.
Cup(a) Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a team played in
the national cup in the week before (or the week after) a
Bundesliga match.
ECT(a) Dummy variable that is equal to 1 if a team played in
an European club tournament in the week before (or the
week after) a Bundesliga match.
Age(a,b) Average age (in years).
Tenure(a,b) Average duration of club membership (in years).
Bundesliga matches(a) Average number of Bundesliga matches.
European matches(a) Average number of matches in European club tourna-
ments.
Championship matches(a) Average number of matches in European and World
Championship matches.
Top-League matches(a) Average number of matches in highest soccer divisions in
England, France, Italy, and Spain.
Market value(a,c) Average of logged market value.
FIFA score(a,c) Average playing strength in video game FIFA.
Age (manager)(a) Age of the manager.
Membership (manager)(a) Number of years in which the manager was in charge of
the team.
Bundesliga matches (manager)(a) Total number of Bundesliga matches that a manager was
in charge of a Bundesliga team.
Opponent-Season fixed effects Set of season-specific dummy variables that indicate the
opponent of the team.
Ranking fixed effects Set of dummy variables that capture the current ranking
positions of the opposing teams.
Notes: This table lists all variables that are included in the vector X. (a) indicates that X includes this variable for
both the team and its opponent. (b) indicates that X includes the squared term of the variable. (c) indicates that X
does not include this variable if we use the full sample.
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Table C.3 Birthplace diversity and team performance: fixed effect estimates (linear model).
Goal Difference Points
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Diversity (β1) -0.905*** -0.876** -0.819*** -0.905***
(0.002) (0.021) (0.000) (0.001)
Observations 14,076 7,956 14,076 7,956
Seasons 23 13 23 13
Quality controls No Yes No Yes
Notes: The table reports results from fixed effect regressions. All regressions include team, manager, and opponent
characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We cluster standard
errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table C.4 First-stage estimates (expected starting line-up).
(1) (2)
Diversity Kicker 0.363*** 0.033
(0.000) (0.537)
Diversity Kicker squared -0.030 0.311***
(0.553) (0.000)
Observations 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13
Dependent Variable BDiv BDiv2
SaWi F-statistic 125.52 287.19
Notes: The table reports first-stage estimates. For the corresponding second-stage estimates, see Table 2. Standard
errors are clustered at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and p-values are reported in parentheses. *, **,
and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table C.5 Zero-stage and first-stage estimates (unexpected changes).
Zero-stage estimates First-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3)
∆(B, C) − ∆(A, C) 0.0457***
(0.000)
B̂Div 0.984*** 1.009***
(0.000) (0.000)
B̂Div
2
0.011 0.140
(0.898) (0.197)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13
Dependent Variable BDiv BDiv BDiv2
SaWi F-statistic - 13.41 14.02
Notes: The table reports zero-stage and first-stage estimates. For the corresponding second-stage estimates, see
Table 3. Standard errors are clustered at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and p-values are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.6 Birthplace diversity and team performance: 2SLS estimates (unexpected changes, injuries)
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.688 0.527 0.631** 0.613
(0.115) (0.388) (0.049) (0.264)
Regression coefficients
B˜Div 5.038 0.968
(0.158) (0.705)
B˜Div
2
-3.661* -0.918
(0.063) (0.520)
Diversity team (β1) 42.169* 10.14
(0.097) (0.529)
Diversity squared team (β2) -33.425* -8.274
(0.091) (0.513)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 9.68 9.68
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 10.14 10.14
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.347
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table C.7 Zero-stage and first-stage estimates (unexpected changes, injuries).
Zero-stage estimates First-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3)
∆(B˜, C˜) − ∆(A˜, C˜) 0.0459***
(0.000)
B˜Div 0.946*** 1.042***
(0.000) (0.000)
B˜Div
2
0.038 0.158
(0.681) (0.169)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13
Dependent Variable BDiv BDiv BDiv2
SaWi F-statistic - 9.68 10.14
Notes: The table reports zero-stage and first-stage estimates. For the corresponding second-stage estimates, see
Table C.6. Standard errors are clustered at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and p-values are reported in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.8 Alternative measure of birthplace diversity (expected starting line-up).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.549** 0.543** 0.567** 0.560**
(0.027) (0.034) (0.028) (0.035)
Regression coefficients
Diversity Kicker 2.368** 1.601*
(0.042) (0.059)
Diversity Kicker squared -2.168** -1.476**
(0.035) (0.048)
Diversity team (β1) 6.994** 4.709*
(0.040) (0.056)
Diversity squared team (β2) -6.171** -4.201**
(0.034) (0.047)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 151.61 151.61
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 302.56 302.56
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.9 Alternative measure of birthplace diversity (unexpected changes).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.704* 0.594 0.569** 0.558*
(0.087) (0.132) (0.041) (0.072)
Regression coefficients
B̂Div 6.481** 2.770
(0.044) (0.195)
B̂Div
2
-4.600** -2.331
(0.035) (0.116)
Diversity team (β1) 52.93* 26.258
(0.076) (0.145)
Diversity squared team (β2) -46.490* -23.511
(0.077) (0.140)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 7.23 7.23
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 7.35 7.35
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.002
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.10 Alternative definition of team (expected starting line-up).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.541** 0.516* 0.549** 0.524*
(0.045) (0.055) (0.045) (0.058)
Regression coefficients
Diversity Kicker 1.909* 1.313
(0.091) (0.109)
Diversity Kicker squared -1.766* -1.274*
(0.057) (0.064)
Diversity team (β1) 4.413 3.035
(0.089) (0.116)
Diversity squared team (β2) -4.021* -2.895*
(0.056) (0.068)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 161.87 161.87
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 326.46 326.46
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.11 Alternative definition of team (unexpected changes).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.641** 0.520* 0.567** 0.555*
(0.013) (0.093) (0.031) (0.073)
Regression coefficients
B̂Div 3.838** 1.517
(0.029) (0.199)
B̂Div
2
-2.994*** -1.458*
(0.009) (0.068)
Diversity team (β1) 34.266* 16.591
(0.062) (0.145)
Diversity squared team (β2) -30.221* -14.941
(0.057) (0.134)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 9.20 9.20
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 9.59 9.59
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.12 Performance trend (expected starting line-up)
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.578* 0.553* 0.599* 0.574*
(0.076) (0.066) (0.078) (0.073)
Regression coefficients
Diversity Kicker 1.895 1.386
(0.121) (0.132)
Diversity Kicker squared -1.639 -1.252
(0.107) (0.102)
Diversity team (β1) 6.047 4.435
(0.126) (0.145)
Diversity squared team (β2) -5.046 -3.862
(0.112) (0.114)
Observations 6,815 6,815 6,815 6,815
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 96.90 96.90
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 222.36 222.36
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2), club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects, and the first
and second lag of the dependent variable. We cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level
and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table C.13 Performance trend (unexpected changes)
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.440 0.194 0.572* 0.546
(0.223) (0.378) (0.079) (0.112)
Regression coefficients
B̂Div 2.193 0.552
(0.443) (0.767)
B̂Div
2
-2.494 -1.423
(0.115) (0.176)
Diversity team (β1) 26.062 14.296
(0.158) (0.223)
Diversity squared team (β2) -22.774 -13.101
(0.133) (0.178)
Observations 6,815 6,815 6,815 6,815
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 11.22 11.02
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 11.85 11.61
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2), club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects, and the first
and second lag of the dependent variable. We cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level
and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level,
respectively.
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Table C.14 Alternative definition of country of origin (expected starting line-up).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.638* 0.594* 0.658* 0.612*
(0.074) (0.058) (0.085) (0.063)
Regression coefficients
Diversity Kicker 2.250** 1.467**
(0.014) (0.033)
Diversity Kicker squared -1.765** -1.234**
(0.029) (0.043)
Diversity team (β1) 7.046** 4.636**
(0.013) (0.033)
Diversity squared team (β2) -5.350** -3.786**
(0.030) (0.044)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 129.87 129.87
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 263.65 263.65
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.15 Alternative definition of country of origin (unexpected changes)
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.409 0.259 0.538** 0.523
(0.253) (0.429) (0.038) (0.141)
Regression coefficients
B̂Div 2.028 0.511
(0.382) (0.748)
B̂Div
2
-2.479* -0.988
(0.054) (0.270)
Diversity team (β1) 25.110* 9.980
(0.076) (0.282)
Diversity squared team (β2) -23.336 -9.540
(0.063) (0.248)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 14.41 14.41
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 15.35 15.35
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.020
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.16 Alternative procedure for measuring unexpected changes in birthplace diversity
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.629* 0.524 0.594** 0.581*
(0.050) (0.206) (0.020) (0.077)
Regression coefficients
B̂Div 5.939* 2.206
(0.059) (0.302)
B̂Div
2
-4.723** -2.106
(0.018) (0.126)
Diversity team (β1) 45.242** 19.731
(0.040) (0.153)
Diversity squared team (β2) -38.070** -16.975
(0.035) (0.136)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) - - 12.79 12.79
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) - - 13.20 13.20
StWr p-value - - 0.000 0.000
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. The upper part of the table shows the
results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.17 Linear model (expected starting line-up).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression coefficients
Diversity Kicker 0.020 -0.047
(0.946) (0.827)
Diversity team (β1) 0.061 -0.144
(0.944) (0.822)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic - - 641.13 641.13
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table C.18 Linear model (unexpected changes).
Reduced-form estimates Second-stage estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression coefficients
∆(B, C) − ∆(A, C) 0.010 -0.024
(0.895) (0.654)
Diversity team (β1) 0.226 -0.516
(0.893) (0.644)
Observations 7,956 7,956 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Points Goal Diff. Points
SaWi F-statistic - - 263.92 263.92
Notes: The table reports reduced-form estimates and second-stage estimates. All regressions include team, manager,
and opponent characteristics (for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We
cluster standard errors at the club-by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
A17
Table C.19 Piecewise linear regression approach.
Expected line-up Unexpected changes
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression coefficients
Diversity team (β1) 4.016** -2.993* -17.533* 20.083***
(0.027) (0.075) (0.064) (0.003)
Observations 2,139 5,817 1,737 1,325
Seasons 13 13 13 13
Outcome Goal Diff. Goal Diff. Goal Diff. Goal Diff.
SaWi F-statistic 95.44 384.53 14.18 28.67
Diversity level (BDiv) < 0.6 > 0.6 > 0.6 > 0.6
Change in Diversity (Z) - - > 0.0 < 0.0
Notes: The table reports second-stage estimates. All regressions include team, manager, and opponent characteristics
(for a list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the club-
by-season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table C.20 Heterogeneity in optimal level of birthplace diversity.
Performance in offense Performance in defense
(1) (2)
Lind-Mehlum-Test
Optimal diversity (BDiv∗) 0.676 0.503
(0.228) (0.106)
Regression coefficients
Diversity team (β1) 2.570* -2.913
(0.087) (0.211)
Diversity squared team (β2) -1.901 2.896
(0.164) (0.134)
Observations 7,956 7,956
Seasons 13 13
Outcome Goals scored Goals allowed
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv) 151.46 185.85
SaWi F-statistic (BDiv2) 286.82 359.96
StWr p-value 0.001 0.002
Team Midfielder + Forwards Defender + Midfielder
Notes: The table shows second-stage estimates. The upper part reports the results of the Lind-Mehlum-Test, the
lower part presents regression coefficients. All regressions include team, manager, and opponent characteristics (for a
list, see Table C.2) and club-by-season-by-round-by-manager fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the club-by-
season-by-round-by-manager level and report p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance
at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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Table C.21 Effect of team performance on number of fielded offensive players (within-match
variation).
(1) (2)
Behind at the beginning of a period 0.070*** 0.074***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 253,368 143,208
Seasons 23 13
Quality controls No Yes
R2 0.933 0.937
Notes: The table reports estimates from a dynamic fixed effect model. The dependent variable is the number of
forwards on the field at the end of a five-minute period. All regressions include team and opponent controls and
a set of team-by-match fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the team-by-match level and report p-values in
parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table C.22 Effect of team performance on birthplace diversity (within-match variation).
(1) (2)
Behind at the beginning of a period 0.001*** 0.001***
(0.000) (0.004)
Observations 253,368 143,208
Seasons 23 13
Quality controls No Yes
R2 0.978 0.975
Notes: The table reports estimates from a dynamic fixed effect model. The dependent variable is the birthplace
diversity of the players on the field at the end of a five-minute period. All regressions include team and opponent
controls and a set of team-by-match fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the team-by-match level and report
p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
Table C.23 Channel through which team performance affects birthplace diversity (within-match
variation).
(1) (2)
Behind at the beginning of a period -0.000 -0.000
(0.804) (0.456)
Fielded forwards at the end of a period 0.017*** 0.016***
(0.000) (0.000)
Observations 253,368 143,208
Seasons 23 13
Quality controls No Yes
R2 0.978 0.975
Notes: The table reports estimates from a dynamic fixed effect model. The dependent variable is the birthplace
diversity of the players on the field at the end of a five-minute period. All regressions include team and opponent
controls and a set of team-by-match fixed effects. We cluster standard errors at the team-by-match level and report
p-values in parentheses. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.
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